ladies and gentlemen good afternoon to those of you who are here with us and those of us who fall online welcome it is a great pleasure and it is an honor for us to have president woodhouse with us professor nerd house he's going to voice a proposal of his to accelerate the mitigation process of emissions by means of an agreement amongst countries professor nordhaus was born in albuquerque in new mexico in the u.s he attended yale university and he's also attended university in france and at the mit he he then became a professor at the yearly university where he still holds a chair today professor not house has been awarded several prizes uh for example he sits at the national academy on sciences he's been the president of the association of economists in the u.s but i believe that he's most important as a chairperson for committees at the national academy for example on very disciplinary subjects as a nuclear power alternative energy and at the very time when this problem cropped up in the 70s he drafted a report on global warning warming and on the potential policies to counter that so it this interdisciplinary nature comes through its all papers and books indeed he he's been working on salaries on economic growth and he's also has published papers on exotic subjects as it were as for example his drafted drafted works on the light of the earth that should try and explain the granular level of gdp not just at national and level but at a much more local level than he has drafted papers on health on the cost of the war in iraq on the way artificial intelligence may impact economic growth but one of the subjects that perhaps has been closest to his arch is that of the connection between climate change and economic growth him he's been awarded a noble prize for economic either with brahma in 2018 and he developed models and i'm talking about such models because i believe this is a central subject because the language of mathematics that he develops enable or pave the way to the interdisciplinary approach that perhaps has been unparalleled he actually crafted a new discipline open source and he made such models available on the web open source so that anybody worldwide can work on such models further develop it or question it or he's been a forerunner of the concept of open science or something on which europe is pushing forward having said as much i'd like to give him the floor he is going to have some 30 35 minutes contribution then we'll take some questions if you want to ask questions you can do so also on the online channel and then i'm going to address him the questions that you have having said as much and without any further ado i'd like to give them the floor so over to you professor now the house professor bossetti it's wonderful to see you valentina and it's a great honor to address this audience i'm sorry that i suppose along with many other people i'm sorry that i am in my house rather than joining you in italy so what i would like to do is talk today about national and international policies to slow climate change this of course will be well understood in europe in the eu which has been really a forerunner a pioneer in developing policies at the national level and at the multinational level other countries are further behind and the country in which i am is so far behind as to be invisible but we're not going to talk about politics today we're going to talk about economics and the economics about slowing global warming so i have some slides i would like to share with you today and they're they're really not complicated slides uh they're more to orient you as we go along so again international and national policies on global warming so these are the four issues i'd like to talk to you about today uh the first one is um a combination of science and economics it's that there's been very little progress in slowing emissions uh and i'll i'll start with that then i want to say a word about the particular challenges of the incentives for low-carbon technologies uh that will be a key problem going forward third i will mention the important role of carbon pricing this is well known among economists and environmentalists but not so widely known among the population and perhaps not that widely accepted among the public and then finally i'd like to talk about the need for a climate compact to combat international free writing can i get it yes yes yes yes it's perfect okay i just want to make sure that i'm not talking to myself no you're not we're all here for you thank you all right let's start with global co2 emissions uh these are the best data we can come up with these are data going back for over a century um the blue line is the global emissions of co2 these include as best we can not just energy and semantic co2 but other industrial co2 but not land emissions those are in billions of tons per year and the red line there straight line on logarithmic paper is a rate of growth averaging 2.6 per year over this period and at the top i put a green circle up here let's see if i can this this green circle uh just to focus your eyes on that what you can see is that through the latest data which we have which is 2019 preliminary data with the latest data there's very little slowdown in the growth uh it is it is it depends on how far back you look but basically it's growing at uh in the last few years at roughly two percent a year of course if we're going to meet our targets that has to not just stop growing rapidly but has to decline um but the main point of this is that it's been growing rapidly co2 emissions have been growing rapidly and even with all the treaties and accords kyoto copenhagen and paris we've not seen a slowdown i thought it might be interesting to ask what's happened during the pandemic so this shows you the co2 concentrations in the atmosphere at manolo in hawaii and these are actually weekly data going back to 1957 and you can see i don't have it in here but you can see at the very end here that there has not been a slowdown even though there has been some slowdown in economic activity we're in the midst of a global recession you can't actually see that in the co2 concentrations so this this uh is also an interesting suggestion that it will take more than just slower economic growth to slow climate change okay so let's move on now just i just wanted to give you a little taste of um the science here and let's move on to the role of economics and climate policy so the three insights that i'd like to bring to you from climate from economics the first is about technological change and innovation the second is about carbon pricing and the third is about international agreements so let's start with low carbon technologies the key point that really we need to begin with is that in that of course new technologies require inventions innovations research development commercialization and what we know from economic studies for half a century is that there are very big spillovers just as there are in pollution there are very big spillovers in the returns to innovation the inventors the innovators capture relatively little of the social value of their inventions so if we look at the po the second bullet there the public returns on innovation we know that they're many times larger than private returns we don't know two three four ten times the the rate of return on private rate of return on innovation of course they're larger there's a larger gap at the more fundamental end then at the more applied end but the key point is that we know that because of this there's under investment in innovation now even worse there's even a worse story even a more terrible story about low carbon innovations there's actually a double externality here there are two externalities at work there's the innovation externality that if you invent a low-carbon technology an inventor only gets part of the return but also there's the climate impacts externality that even if you do capture some of the return because the emissions are underpriced you'll lose a little more or maybe depending where you're a lot more of the returns to low carbon technologies so this we have to understand that this is a huge impediment to moving forward over the long run over the long run where we know that much of our infrastructure you know all of our countries will need to be replaced over the next 50 years if we move to a zero carbon economy policy will require fixing this climate externality it requires special incentives for low carbon innovation and it means also i'm sorry to fix the in double externality requires two things it requires fixing the climate externality which will be on the next slide and it also requires special incentives for low-carbon technologies but on that one i'm going to pass leave that for another day or maybe for some questions and move to the carbon pricing so that was key economic insight number one i should say also that paul romer who won the nobel prize in economics in 2018 uh won the nobel prize for the first two bullets here for understanding the nature of information for understanding the nature of innovation and invention and for showing how that affected economic growth so let's move to economic insight number two which is about carbon prices if we think of the kinds of policies that are needed not just for the long run but for the near term with existing technologies existing stock of capital or existing designs of capital not talking about fundamental new inventions and innovations but what we have to work with today then the high price on co2 emissions is the key to sharp emissions reductions and it has many features i'll mention some of the reasons the ways in which high co2 prices work first the key thing to understand is that reducing emissions requires actions by virtually everybody it requires action of billions of people around the world it requires actions of millions of companies it requires the actions of hundreds thousands of local governments and requires the actions of hundreds of gov of national governments so you need some way to coordinate the actions of all these different players from the billions of individuals like you and me to the hundreds of governments like the us or italy or japan and the key way to do that and this is the inside of economics is to have a high price on co2 emissions so when people make their decisions as to how to transport themselves what kind of capital to buy whether to replace a refrigerator or a furnace whether to insulate their house whether to walk or to drive whether to take the train or to fly all these kinds of decisions everyday decisions they can be affected by the price of co2 a second feature of a high price of co2 is the decisions of producers producers probably on the more important side of this at least in the short run producers make the decision of how to produce things as well as what to produce and the most important is how to produce them if you take electricity generation the us produces with virtually every technology but some of them are high carbon technologies like coal so a high price on co2 makes coal generation much less profitable it makes natural gas more profitable and it makes renewables even more profitable so this high price will affect the decisions of producers in particularly in industries that are carbon carbon intensive i've already mentioned the third way that high carbon prices affect the our economy and that is through innovation and you and this surprises many people how and it goes back to my last point about the need for stimulating this this uh this slide about low carbon technologies it's a puzzle to many people why are prices important for innovation and the reason is for profit-making companies who do a lot of the r d in energy do a lot of the r d in energy capital they look at the future prices when they decide upon their decisions so if companies are in a low carbon price environment and think it will continue to be a low-carbon price environment then they have very small very little incentive to invest in low carbon technologies on the other hand if they're in a high carbon price environment and particularly one where they see not only high but rapidly rising carbon prices then they will be they will have an incentive to turn to low carbon technologies for their research and development and there's one simple example that makes this point if you think of this of uh carbon capture and sequestration which is a technology just think of it as taking the carbon out of the out of uh out of a gap of the stack gas turning it into a liquid pumping it somewhere putting it somewhere where it lasts for a long time this technology will cost according to different estimates a hundred dollars a ton of co2 some as high as 300 dollars of co2 of co2 but no company will be interested in doing this if the price of co2 is zero when the price of co2 rises sharply then production of co2 which is what this technology is will become profitable and companies will think about it but at that point they will also begin to do research and development on these technologies so technologies like ccns carbon capture and sequestration and similar ones which don't make any sense in a zero carbon environment will make sense in a high carbon environment a fourth reason is that actually carbon pricing simplifies our lives as individuals as ethical individuals many of us worry about our carbon footprint and the reason we worry about our carbon footprint is this carbon is mispriced if carbon were appropriately priced we wouldn't need to worry about our carbon footprint because the social cost of our activities would be embodied in the goods and services that we consume so those are the reasons that economists have developed for looking at carbon prices and thinking that they're a key to changing our system our energy system so what else have economists pointed to they pointed the fact that the level of price should be harmonized and it should it should be set to meet your climate target so let's take the second of these two let's assume you want to reach a two degree c temperature target then what you need to do is working backwards with your technologies your economic growth the different industries the different countries you need to work back to what are the emissions that are consistent with that target and then you need to work backwards from that to the carbon price that is consistent with the emissions that are consistent with your temperature target so one of the problem that that's a pretty it's that's a conceptually pretty straightforward although empirically rather complicated it's interesting that when valentina mentioned the integrated assessment models that economists have developed that's actually the one of the most important things they can do is they can ask what level of carbon price will induce what level of missions which will lead to what level of global temperature or working backwards from temperature or another target to emissions and to carbon prices so that's one important feature of carbon prices a second one is that they should be harmonized by harmonized i mean they should be actually should be equalized across different uses of carbon of emissions of carbon dioxide that would be among foreign firms in the same industry they should be equal among industries in the same country they should be equal and among countries they should be equal so for example if we take the case of europe to a first approximation co2 prices are equalized in the sectors that are covered by the european scheme emission scheme or plan but not outside it so that they're harmonized within but not outside it and they're not harmonized outside it really at all finally they should be harmonized across countries to minimize the cost of meeting our climate targets final point what are prices what should they be and how are we meeting our target well the nor if you take the second bullet and ask what is a normative carbon price that you would meet say for a cost benefit analysis or for a two degree target or a three degree target i won't ask about a one and a half degree target because most models can't reach it but they would be somewhere in the range of 40 or 50 a ton at one end up to as much as 200 a ton at the other end so the numbers started around 40 or 50 dollars for the most modest objectives and go up from there again so let's say fifty dollars a ton of co2 harmonized all sectors all companies all nations so the question is how are we doing not well so this slide shows you the carbon price landslide escape for 2019 these numbers are from the world bank and what i've done is rank them from top to bottom by uh the effective carbon price effective carbon price is the percentage of the region covered the carbon price and then the product of those two and the last column shows the fraction of global emissions that are covered in sweden norway switzerland bc france california the ets and so on down and the last line is 80 of the globe is uncovered and then the bottom where the little circle is shows the effective carbon price averaged across the countries is around two dollars a ton so the key there are two points here that i'd like you to take away one is obviously the prices are not harmonized they're not not harmonized across the countries uh there are a few that are modestly high and they're the vast majority which are zero and also they're very low they're nowhere near the lowest of the estimates that are produced by the models and there's certainly nowhere near what would be needed to achieve our two degree target so this brings me to the last insight of economics which is the third the third key insight is the global free rider problem now i suspect the first two of these are well known to many of you and reasonably well known to most of you but the global free rider problem is one you might know in your you might know in the in the sense you have observed it but not have thought about a lot as you think about carbon policy so the basic point i'd like to make here is that after 30 years of working on climate policy we're at a dead end if we start with cup one cup two cup three cup four cup five cup six and go on through whatever the latest is cop 20 something they all have been motivated by a simple model and flawed model of international agreements flawed for this kind of problem and the reason is they have been the conceptual underpinnings of the kyoto protocol the copenhagen the k accord paris accord is as voluntary international agreements not mandatory ones not ones that i'll turn to in a minute the result of that is that we see the free rider problem and i'll just say what i mean by the free rider problem you all probably know what it is but my the example i usually use when i think of free riders or talk to people i think of a european trolley system where you get on and you don't have a you don't have a ticket uh you don't have a pass and you say should i or should i not buy a pass it's pretty expensive so maybe i'll just ride free um and because nobody ever gets caught well i don't know if it's true nobody ever gets caught but if you think that nobody ever gets caught i'm gonna ride free then you've succumbed to the free rider problem now if we turn to the free why it's a free why this is a free rider for climate change treaties and agreements international ones i should say um there are two reasons well the main one is that they are voluntary they are not mandatory for countries to join secondly even for countries that join there are no penalties for non-participation or for non-adherence countries that didn't participate in the binding limits of the kyoto protocol which were most countries of the world were not penalized and then countries which didn't meet their targets under the kyoto protocol weren't penalized so these are in some deep sense voluntary agreements teddy roosevelt once said about american foreign policy speak softly carry a big stick well for climate agreements its countries talk loud and carry no stick at all now why do i say this what's the evidence for this well one piece of evidence is just the underlying economics of this but i'll pass on that but the other one is that both on the prices and the quantities we see in the last slide that the average level of carbon prices in the world is very low and this kind of carbon price is never going to get you to a two degree target and then the other is if we go back to this slide you also see that there's been very little change in the rate of growth of co2 emissions and that's another piece of evidence that if you had an effective climate policy that this curve would be turning down would have turned down up before now so the verdict is we have international agreements they're voluntary they have no penalties for non-performance they are therefore subject to free riding and if we actually look at the both the prices and the emissions we see there has been free writing this is not just theory this is reality so final slide uh what what can we possibly do about that so one idea is to redesign international agreements and i call it a climate club or a climate compact to overcome free riding and the basic point about this is to think of a different model for such an agreement and i like to think of it as a club structure what is a club a club is something we're all in different kinds of clubs or compacts but a club is easiest to think of you you when you're in a club you have certain privileges and you have certain obligations your obligations are usually to pay the dues and the privileges are whatever the club does it might be a gym club it might be a running club it might be a swim club might be a ski club whatever many organizations we are in have the same structure if you work at a university you have the privilege of working at the university but you have obligation if you're a student you have the privilege of learning at a university but you also have to follow the rules not to mention the tuition at least in some places so we need to move from a structure where they're all privileges and no obligations to one where their privileges and obligations so the climate compact that i would i will mention involves two features the first feature is what you call the obligation the costly obligation and this would be an obligation to have a certain carbon price domestically perhaps fifty dollars per ton of co2 doesn't say how you meet that it could be through cap and trade as in europe it could be through a carbon tax as in british columbia but that part of the requirements of being in the compact is that you meet your agreed upon obligation the obligation is part of the agreement that underlies a compact so that people agree to it when they join it and the second part is a penalty tariff on non-participants so that if you are either a non-participant or you violate the agreement then you are met with a penalty tariff by the members of the compactor club i would add for those of you who have thought about this and many of you have that the one difference i don't know if it's a slight difference but difference of this proposal from a standard is that this proposal assumes a uniform tariff on all imports rather than a tariff on the carbon content of imports it's for technical economic reasons uh the uniform tariff is a better one uh there's been some modeling uh at yale where we did where we did this i've done it and others have done it and the modeling using another kind of modeling of the kind that valentina discussed but uses coalition modeling suggests that this kind of two things one is if you use these coalition models you'll see that a kyoto or paris type agreement rapidly degenerates into a non-cooperative low abatement agreement but i'll suggest that a climate compact of the kind i'm discussing here with a carbon price and a penalty on non-participants can actually induce high abatement and combat free writing okay so let me um let me summarize um so i think the first insight of economics in this is that low-carbon technologies are plagued by this double externality the externality of the innovation spillover in the externality of climate emission of co2 and other emissions themselves a key part of our policy if we're going to combat this is to have high and harmonized carbon prices and i stress both of those high and harmonized if we look around the world we have low and unharmonized prices today and then third point is that we can have strong incentive compatible international agreements if with a climate compact and the climate compact is a compact of countries where you have mandatory carbon price policies plus tariff penalties for non-participants well thank you for thank you for bearing with me i'm glad to be with you and uh again i'm sorry i'm 3000 miles away rather than in this in a hall to join you and that's it for this thank you very much thank you thank you bill for being with us uh as usual what the parlor in english the queen i apologize i forgot i should be speaking italian whenever you speak there's something that trusts me nuts that you never use any wrong word you speak slowly but you always say the perfect word it is such a pleasure to follow your meeting i'm going to read out a few questions they've been uh written in english but because of the function of the meeting i'm going to read them out in italian the first has to do with the chart that you showed on the co2 concentrations you showed us this chart because that includes the most recent data you had and it shows that chart shows that co2 is on the increase roberto barpierro is asking you but as a matter of fact emissions which is something different from concentrations have dropped with cabranovirus the rate of this decline hasn't been accounted for as yet but the real problem has to do with the resumption of business as usual with emissions growing even stronger to recover to to recover from covid and this is something that has to be avoided what do you think about this um i i think many of us know that co2 emissions have fallen since march um so maybe since february we don't have very good measures of global co2 emissions they lag at least a year behind a reality um we suspect that they're down maybe 10 or 20 percent but we don't actually have the data but what i was interested in is was what's the impact on what actually matters for climate change which is concentrations and i thought when i first looked at this i looked at this about a month ago that you would be able to see some slight decline let me go let me just go back to that slide so we know what we're looking at here i thought we would be we would be able to see a slight decline in emissions so this is this has a seasonal cycle which uh you might take out but i didn't take out um but i thought well maybe instead of just going up up up up up like this it would go maybe like this so maybe decline a little bit and i was actually very struck by the fact that you actually even all the statistical analyses i did of this i couldn't find any sign at all of a decline in co2 concentrations and this by the way is through september 15th you can have weekly data so this is not like last year or last month this is this is like two weeks ago data as of two weeks ago weekly data i mean it's incredible one thing i'd say what incredible data i mean the people who i just would bow down to the people i know they are but i won't mention them but they're not the the people who thought were had the idea of collecting these data and of course another valentina talked about open science making these data available to people wonder what a wonderful public service so what do i take so coming back to this graph what do i take of it really two things uh one is that there's tremendous inertia the key thing is there's tremendous inertia in the earth system even though we're in the middle of probably the worst global recession since the depression maybe maybe not the worst but maybe the financial crisis was worse but i don't know but pretty close you cannot see it in these data because there's so much inertia and the inertia comes from the carbon cycle cycling through the oceans and the biosphere so we can't count on sure this just reminds us we can't count on short-term measures to reduce this key driver of climate change and then the other thing i that was really the most important thing i took from this but the other other thing i took from this was people say well all you have to do is slow the economy well maybe so but we've had a pretty dramatic slowdown of the economy and here again we don't see any change so uh again i i thought this was um uh just a reminder of the tremendous inertia and of course this is just one part of the inertia because there's a further inertia in the sense that the climate change itself lags behind the concentrations and then there's another five decades and then there's another lag as some of the global impacts such as the melting of the giant ice sheets lag further behind temperature so it's just a reminder of the tremendous inertia of the system it's not like the pandemic where it just doubles every three four days this is something where it's a very long-term problem and we have to deal with it now knowing it and this is just a wonderful example of how much inertia there is in the system thank you very much a second question from santardone who's asking about with your model dies industrially emissions influence climate change based on carbon but in the present situation and referring to the poscovid crisis where both the gdp and emissions on the yearly basis will be reduced importantly what do you think is going to be the result of your model do you think there's going to be a such a rapid recovery with gdp and emissions so that the actual drop is going to be offset or compensated um one of the things i've learned in my many mistakes as an economist is not to forecast something that's so intrinsically difficult as recovered from this we we've heard a lot in climate economics about fat tales and many of you will know the work of martin weitzman recently died of harvard university who pointed to the possibility of fat tales in impacts of impacts of climate change on human societies um and uh there was a big argument about whether that's they are affected or they're not fat tails but in any case it alerts us to the presence well this this is a very fat tailed event we have never in our modern economy seen anything like this and so i'm very hesitant to make any i'm not only hesitant i'm not going to make any forecasts about the recovery whether it will v shape or w shaped or l-shaped or whether it'll be a year or whether it be a decade but i do think just following my last answer i do think that this by itself is going to make very little difference to the trajectory of climate change the only thing that's going to make a big difference to the trajectory will be sharp reductions in emissions year after year after year reduction after reduction after reduction and that's going to require the two things we talked about earlier it's require radical changes in technology and it's required high carbon prices and i think the lesson uh the lesson of these recessions is they hardly lead leave a a trace i could go back and show what happened in the financial crisis there again you can hardly see a trace of the uh financial crisis in the concentrations of co2 so i i think um you know we're all um it's it's it's sometimes hard to think of anything else when your life is a danger and your family's life of danger and your friends lives are in danger and there's so much disruption of our lives um but uh if you want to think about climate change you have to think about what we're going to do after the pandemic and even in the pandemic um and the pandemic itself is is probably not going to leave much of a mark a question concerning climate clubs at a time when changing policies seemed to be key do you think that the club you think of could give enough incentives to be accepted who should promote it and how i i'm not sure i understand the question but i'll answer it and then if you can follow up if it wasn't what you were asking i think we are in a situation where we do not have a club now or compact i think i prefer the climate compact to the uh as a term um i mean you might say europe has a climate compact it knows how this works it has its ets so it knows it has the administrative experience and the skill to set up a climate compact um but i think to make it work you'll have to have probably three big regions you'll have to have europe you'll have to have the united states and you'll have to have china europe is already in a way on board president xi announced at the united nations that they were not going to join a compact but they had very very ambitious climate targets that were announced and the u.s in the post-trump era whenever that occurs i think will be ripe for this kind of idea outside the climate deniers and the energy industry and other people who of that persuasion there's very widespread support in the united states for strong climate policies there's pretty strong support for cli for carbon pricing of different kinds and i think more and more people are realizing that this requires an international solution so i think what you need is basically the these three country regions eu us and china to start uh it'll be even better of course if the other major countries come along um but that does require a certain critical mass i might add that uh there is there is um there's a kind of uh cumulative effect here though it's a little bit like the eu once you get going then uh people want to join it um so you need to set it up and then once it's set up and it seemed to be working and it and the the trade incentives are part of it then i think it will have a kind of snowball effect trade thank you very much for brilliantly answering the question you understood well the green new deal in europe have a discussion on the idea of carbon tariffs not really like the ones you mentioned but we have got started so the idea of having a scheme of emission trading with a stringent cap with the idea of carbon tariffs that could be the first step in that direction that you suggested uh yes i mean i think the the there's just back up so for many years uh there have been proposals for countervailing duties for countries that didn't participate in in carbon pricing or emissions trading um and that was uh it's it's been talked about for many many years for probably 20 years was talked about at the time of the kyoto protocol it's also included in the montreal protocol on the chlorofluorocarbons the provision for trade sanctions for non-participants um so it's not a foreign idea it's it's it's well thought out uh in the u.s i should say not everybody knows but in the u.s plan that was passed uh that passed the house but not the senate uh in 2009 that included the same kind of border tax adjustment it was a little complicated and used a different mechanism but that did include it so my view is that that is that that is a necessary part of any plan to get countries together i'll just say why i prefer the uniform tariff to the standard approach just because that's an important point the first reason is that the countervailing duty is a very small incentive because it actually doesn't it doesn't hit very many dollars and it doesn't hit them very hard and i'll give you one example why it doesn't work very well if a country is generating electricity with coal and consuming that electricity domestically then there's no trade so there will be no incentives there will be no countervailing duty on that so all the call that the let's say that we're countervailing duty on the united states exports of in terms of the coal of the carbon content it wouldn't hit the biggest industry for producing the co2 which is coal generated coal fire generation so that's one thing it it actually doesn't it doesn't um it doesn't hit in it doesn't have a very large impact the other thing is that it's actually quite complicated to define a uniform tariff is that simple we're just it's just everything comes across the border you have to define what it is all goods maybe some services and bam three three percent tariff on that for a countervailing duty the people who thought about this uh basically go to just just find themselves tortured by the issues i mean it's easy to put a counterfailing duty on things like coal or oil but what do you do about the carbon that's embodied in products say what do you do about steel what do you do about automobiles automobiles have steel but this and the steel has iron ore and iron ore might be produced by coal so how many how many how many steps do you go back in the production process or if something is produced with electricity then you have to figure out how much of the electricity is is produced by carbon fuels and non-carbon fuels everything we use as electricity so trying to disentangle the carbon content of our foreign trade is just a horribly different thing difficult thing so what happens usually is people say okay just direct just correct carbon content but then that leaves out a lot of the carbon consumption of a country but i do agree on the question i do think it's a good place to start i do think it has to be done in the spirit not in the spirit of panelizing countries companies or countries not in spirit penalizing countries but in the spirit of a proposal to broaden the group say look we don't really want to do this what we'd like to do is have a group with a compact where we agree to have common policies and this is what we're going to do to provide incentives to people not to just penalize bad people or bad countries but as a way of trying to bring countries in thank you very much it was a pleasure to have you here and seeing you again and i hope we could meet again here in italy or elsewhere thank you very much and good night you