um innovation is the one that later perspective can they actually provide uh is elections perspective so i'm very pleased to give him the thoughts giveaway thank you professor james microphone can you hear me with this microphone i'm very pleased to be here so the world at the moment is gripped by a radical doubt about globalization i think it became particularly acute in the g20 in in the g7 summit in taomina we're going to have the g20 in hamburg in a few weeks time but at the g7 it was really a lot for me to grow okay and at the g7 it was really quite uh noticeable uh that the countries of the world seem to be united against the united states and the president of the united states was making this big anti-globalization pitch and it's also striking that the british prime minister theresa may didn't stay for the full two days of charmina but left early on the friday evening and that then last week when president trump announced that he would get out of the paris climate agreement prime minister may refused to endorse the eu declaration of support for the paris agreement so it looked as if the two countries the united states and the united kingdom that had really constructed the infrastructure the institutions of the global economic order in the global political order in 1945 were retreating and stepping aside and it very vividly raised i think the possibility of deglobalization of another reversal of globalization and i think ever since 2007 2008 for the last 10 years since the beginning of the financial crisis people have been continually thinking about this particular question can something like the great depression this big destructive turning away from globalization and turning also to nationalism can that be repeated then there's another alternative that i would like to think about this afternoon is there a alternative kind of globalization sometimes people call this globalization 2.0 associated with china associated with the one belt one road or the new silk road initiative a completely different kind of globalization less concentrated on financial liberalization and with the substantial suspicion of many aspects of financial liberalization and instead thinking about how to link the world more closely through big infrastructure projects through shipping through overland communications through energy supply networks so that's an alternative uh globalization that's currently being debated in the face of these challenges on the one hand deglobalization on the other hand a very different kind of globalization 2.0 the people who until recently were the cheerleaders of globalization have started to push back a bit and to say well um there needs to be a different kind of globalization and in the past the people who manage the globalization process didn't take enough regard to compensate those who lost out in the process of globalization and so what is being experienced dramatically in the brexit vote or in the presidential election in the united states is a vote by those people who experience loss i don't want to call them losers because loser is a favorite word of donald trump but i think this argument is problematical i think mainly because it's not really clear what the substantial gains from further globalization in the future will be in other words what the profits from globalization will be that can then be redistributed to the losers um and in fact it seems to me likely that the marginal returns from further global integration are probably falling and at the same time the costs historically incurred by people who've lost out in the globalization process are increasing and faced by that a decreasing amount of money that you could distribute as compensation and increasing claims this idea of compensation i think is is fundamentally uh problematic and indeed that process is the one that i explored in the book uh that senior maserenti kindly referred to in 2001 about previous cycles of globalization because it does seem to me that it's not just the globalization of the 19th century the early 20th century that was knocked during the first world war and then destroyed finally in the great depression that wasn't the only incident of globalization in the past there were globalization episodes in the 18th century when the great british and french colonial empires started off there was globalization in the 16th century led by habsburg spain there was globalization in the medieval period but focused on central asia people talk about the pax mongolica as a president for the pax britannica and the pax americana and in a sense the globe the roman empire was also a globalization and all of those had these pushbacks these setbacks um so the idea that globalization is inevitable and that you simply move on by an inexorable logic to peaceful coexistence and a universal distribution of benefits is i think a really historically naive view of how the world has operated so let me think briefly about the ways in which deglobalization might occur today and globalization you can take it very broadly it's about things that move internationally so goods move people move money moves ideas move and i want to deal with each of those in turn um because of the memory of the great depression and because i think policymakers when they look back at historical episodes of deglobalization really focus on the great depression and the great depression is above all associated with a dramatic collapse of international trade um it's trade that people look at first and wonder whether in the trade area there's likely to be a big push back against globalization so some of you might have heard the panel at 12 o'clock in the um around the corner in the um in the law faculty um and they they were skeptical that there would be a big trade backlash even though there are people in the u.s administration who are very very hostile uh to uh free trade and regard the current trading environment as fundamentally unfair to people like the commerce secretary it's after all important in dealing with trade will baross are the new head of the national trade council peter navarro who wrote a book with the title death by china so he wants to avoid that um i agree that a big systematic pushback on trade is not likely for the following reasons um first of all there are many people in the rich industrial countries who have got substantial benefits from free trade or open uh relatively open trade with low tariff uh boundaries um and um there's a big empirical literature that suggests i think sensibly and there's a kind of logical intuition about this um that it is actually the people who are on lower incomes have less wealth who are most likely to benefit from the openness of markets so there's a kind of paradox here because a lot of the discussion there have been some really nice papers in the united states by david alto in italy um in europe by italo colontone and pierrot about how the the trade shock is responsible for some of the political backlash um but the the problem i think is that there are many people in the united states as well who really like the idea of having cheap t-shirts um i don't think anybody in this room would be particularly upset if they had to pay 20 euros for a t-shirt rather than two or three euros for a t-shirt but that's not true of everybody um and also if you think about this kind of thing you know if you think how much this would cost if it were going to be made in the united states solely or in europe solely um it wouldn't be three or four hundred euros or dollars it would be in the thousands of dollars and then i think again many people would feel that that is that is uh not right um and so uh simply having a across-the-board protectionist legislation um is likely to produce a big popular backlash against measures of that kind um the second point is that the production today is linked in very different ways than it was in the interwar period when there was this protectionist backlash in the interwar period it was mostly a question of exchanging commodities and food from poorer countries for manufactured products from rich countries now there are product chains uh global value chains that go across the world and so th this is uh not i i think uh plausible and that's why uh pushing back on globalization and trade is going to be so costly um and finally um i i think you need to think that most of the jobs that were associated with the china shark have already disappeared and so there aren't that many steel workers in the united states anymore and nobody would now want to open up the old steel plants that were closed down in part because they were technically behind the age secondly let me think about the next kind of globalization um the sentiment that it's not so much trade globalization but that it's migration uh that is undermining living standards um that's a powerfully articulated uh argument in the united states but also in europe um and it's been around for a long time it doesn't even start with the uh financial crisis and it's before that the worry for instance in france about uh polish plumbers or polish nurses uh coming in um does there's something of the same kind of issue that i talked about with trade the same kind of bifurcated sensibility about what the effects of reducing migration would be and it's very vividly i think raised in the case of the united kingdom where the new prime minister theresa may maybe have to wait for next week but maybe she won't be prime minister for that much longer but she's made a really big point consistently long before the brexit referendum even about the importance of restricting migration but on the other hand she's also committed herself to address the question of high housing prices high costs for living in the uk um and she's recognized that that fundamentally can't be tackled except by building a great deal but who is going to do the building um there's already a shortage because of the anxieties about brexit there's a shortage of building workers in the united kingdom so projects that are actually planned to begin can't begin because they're simply not the people to do the jobs and that's because they come mostly from abroad but the the the mindset is divided about this i i was struck really i i thought in fact the moment uh that i believe that david cameron last june would lose the referendum on brexit was when i saw him in a television debate and there was a very angry lady in the audience who identified herself as a worker for the national health service who said don't you realize prime minister mr cameron don't you realize that the national health system national health service is strained beyond capacity by the demands of foreigners coming and demanding health services health treatment by the nhs and she did and she made this point and the prime minister didn't respond in the way that i think many people i think many of you might have responded by saying that without the migrants without the migrants the national health service would be in difficulties because it's the nurses and the but it's also the administrators and the doctors that come from other countries and the national health system really depends on the substantial measure of immigration so turning against migration is likely to happen it's happening already in the united kingdom in the united states but the economic consequences of that will probably be expressed quite quickly in terms of lower growth and lower welfare in general in fact in demographic settings where there's a rapid aging and this is more true of many countries in continental europe than it is in the uk um migration is an important part of the creation of a potential for the future and let me turn to a third area um the globalization of finance and that it seems to me is really where a lot of the problems have always lain and the moments historically when the globalization has tipped into deglobalization those moments have been moments of big financial crises um so i can see three um over the last 110 or so years um the first is little known in 1907 but it's quite interesting and quite important and in a way sets up in a way that i hope to explain briefly the stage for the big geopolitical conflict um for the big geopolitical conflict in 1914 um the crisis uh the stock market panic of 1929 and the banking crisis of 1931 these contagious crises in the great depression and then 2007 2008 uh more recently and in each of those cases um the reaction has been you need to make financial systems more secure against the spillovers of bad policies from other countries you need more national regulation and you need to make sure that regulation occurs in a national setting um and that you aren't affected directly by something that is happening a long long way away so there's a kind of creeping renationalization of finance in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis um and that's in other words an area where you can see um how this this reaction against deglobalization is going to work um it's going to be more acute i think if the united states and the united kingdom respond in the new environment with a reversal of some of the measures of increasing control that they imposed initially in the wake of the financial crisis with dodd-frank in the united states if they push back on that um then the perception in europe and in china will be i think rightly that american and british banks are quite dangerous and that they shouldn't be permitted to undertake these dangerous activities in the european or asian settings so we get a a renationalization of finance and um fourthly though and i think this is really the most critical area um globalization is about the movement of ideas and the movement of information um and the the world is connected in many many ways um and in the aftermath of a big financial crisis like 1907 or like 1929 1931 or like 2007 people in many countries get more sensitized to the geopolitical importance of information let me give you one historical example and then one current example um in 1907 um this global financial crisis started in the united states affected many parts of the world including italy very severely but it didn't affect the country that was then at the center of the international financial system britain and britain had this quite resilient system of small merchant banks that did international trade and were supported by central bank the bank of england but at the time of the 1907 crisis people in other countries realized that these merchant banks and other british financial services insurance were not just a economic activity not just a financial activity but represented an informational advantage that britain could use to impose its will on other countries to prepare military strategies and particularly um in the first decade of the 20th century the british naval intelligence used the information from the merchant banks about what was trading how much grain was being shipped from argentina or canada to germany in order how much shipping was going what the goods carried in the ships were they could get that from the lloyds registers the insurance registers they used that in order to prepare a plan for a naval blockade and so other countries then thought well they have to do something similar and both in germany in the united states before the first world war there were big attempts to build up an equivalent to this financial and insurance system well the equivalent of that in today's terms is not really it seems to me in financial services but it's in information technology it's in google it's in facebook it's in twitter um it's in amazon you can work out what people are buying what they need what they want and the sense is also and it's been vividly reinforced by the revelations with the edward snowden leaks and the wikileaks disclosures that this is something that gives the united states a strategic advantage and that this information is being used strategically by the united states in order to exercise what control it still has in the global system and so if you're in china you want to develop an alternative to amazon and they have got an alternative to amazon you want to have an alternative to google so you get alibaba for amazon you've got bedu for for google russia is very skeptical about the way in which these american information companies work and they've also got their own alternative social media so um the attempt to make a deglobalization of social media is i think the equivalent in the 21st century to that 20th century pushback at the beginning of the 20th century in an age in which there's also a greater sense of the likelihood of geopolitical conflict so how can this system be managed is there any possible way of keeping control of all of this um i think many people looked at the beginning of the year at davos and saw the chinese president xi jinping and saw him laying out a vision in which china would be enforcing rules in a new globalization setting and then some people said well europe should do something like this or germany should do something like this the new york times had a very famous often quoted um headline about how angela merkel was now the leader of the west because of the worries and the uncertainties about the position of the president of the united states so china or germany or europe as potential alternatives and i think there are problems with all of those and that they're they're important to think about um there are problems um in terms of capacity germany is not a very big country and it's got a kind of economic system that in some ways doesn't look right for the world this large trade surplus and current account surplus is worrying to its neighbors uh they don't need to tell you about that um it's worrying to its neighbors um and it's it's worrying to the world and there's a sense also maybe that um in some areas the germans don't play quite straight uh that they cheat slightly in or considerably in regard to say automobile emissions on on cars um in the same way there's a sense that china is cheating with globalization because the chinese markets are really not as open as they should be so it looks a bit hypocritical for xi jinping to be making this case about a chinese-led globalization alternative and in addition to that i think there are in both areas issues about how democracy works in china it's it's very quite simple that china is an autocratic regime with a one-party leadership but which is experimenting with little bits of local democracy so it's in a kind of fragile setting um in terms of its democratic accountability and you can also think that the leaders may think that this is particularly vulnerable in the case of a economic downturn so they're very worried about the prospect of growth in china falling away substantially and that's one of the reasons that they're so committed to the air globalization project um in europe um it's not that germany isn't democratic but the question is how democracy works in a european setting and whether other european countries have enough influence and enough input onto the way in which policy decisions are made and in terms of thinking about how europe is going to respond maybe that is one of the areas where something can be done there are obviously big challenges and it may well be that the the current political setting with britain out and with the united states in an almost hostile position um it makes a lot of sense uh for europeans to get closer together on particular issues so i can think of possibilities for cooperation on defense issues it's clearly a necessity with the current stance of the united states um for cooperation on refugees um because it's it's really just one or two countries italy and greece that are on the frontier of the refugee issue cooperation in terms of coordinating energy markets that's also a critical requirement in the in the situation with security challenges with greater security challenges so there are these possibilities of effectively working together more but then you need to think of ways in which this is accountable accountable to the european parliament um and in which the the powers and the influence of the european parliament are more effectively expressed than they can be in the current setting so working on europe in that way there's plenty to be done there's plenty of potential but it's not there yet and so it's it's a challenge rather than a conclusion and maybe also you should think of the way in which globalization can be managed by international institutions so that was really an important part of the way in which the the open global trade system worked in the aftermath of the second world war after 1945 and uh the international institutions worked it seems to me in three possible ways but none of them are really quite satisfactory in the world as it is today the first way in which international institutions might be envisaged as working is having a quasi-judicial role in arbitrating disputes between countries that works quite well in the trade area the wto works very well in this regard it doesn't work well in the monetary area or in the financial area and attempts to think that for instance currencies are manipulated or currencies are misaligned they've been various attempts to do that but they've never been successful and um the big countries in the past in the 60s and 70s and 80s japan in the current century china or in germany they've never really been effectively sanctioned in this way and there are many reasons why that's very difficult to do so the second area that international institutions worked in was by giving confidential advice on what the appropriate policy was on what the effects on other countries might be of a particular policy or what the spillovers from other countries policies to that country might be um that i think is just less and less possible because advice today doesn't stay private for very long it was originally considered as something like the the priest and the confessional that countries could go and get this absolutely secret advice that would be revealed to nobody but that's not the world of wikileaks and that's not the world of today where everybody writes very quickly about what's been done we know exactly what happened in taumina um it's much too open uh for this this kind of uh confidential advice which was really quite useful and there are particular moments in which you can really see how confidential advice could be useful uh but it's not the practicality of today in the third area is by making big public pronouncements uh as it were taking to a twitter account should international institutions have their own twitter account and be using a public pulpit in order to try to influence policy um that's also really really problematical uh because in this world which is so contested and where there are different sites lining up in questions about say the adjustment of current account balances um it looks as if the international institution will be on the one side and then the other side will just ignore it and say you can't really sanction us you can't do anything about us and the international institution will look ineffective so if that's the case um we've got really a big problem of how this is going to be governed how this is going to work um but there is i think a way out um and that is that the alternative the new style might be to concentrate on the provision of large quantities of information and detailed information real-time information on how economies are developing so that you can see that everybody can see and this is publicly then available everybody can see markets can see people can see governments can see everybody can see how development is taking place and what the particular problems are and what the particular immediate reactions to a particular policy measure might be and this would be i think if you think of this fundamental challenge to globalization today as being about the control of information by networks facebook or twitter that you're not quite sure who controls them and why they're being controlled then this would be the appropriate answer to have a lot of information a lot of real-time information available and to make the world a more knowable place but finally that kind of vision is only going to work if there's also a vision underlying it of what is sustainable um what is healthy what is practicable but what is also in accordance with the needs of the human beings who are interacting with each other and there i think some of the chinese lessons have actually been quite valuable so from the beginning of the financial crisis china has been mounting a kind of rhetorical attack on a world of excessive individualism and stressing more the importance of communities so i don't think this is particularly a chinese uh uniqueness it's actually if you think about it it's the strength of um when italy was really great in terms of being the economic center of the world leading the world in the 15th century the 16th century this is in italy of strong communities of city-states and the idea of strengthening communal bases uh for interaction um then does seem to me to be a important underlying principle that when you're thinking about how europeans should now try to construct this new european order as an alternative to a globalization whose major advocates in the united states and the uk are falling away when europe thinks about how to construct it it needs to be something other than just a top down globalization but needs to rely on this really firm basis of civic spirit civic solidarity and a deep awareness of what humans need what human dignity involves um is the sustainable foundation if you're going to prevent the radical violent deglobalizations that have been so destructive in the past and thank you you said about the need for making information reliable information available to everyone to be used to make decisions and the question that arises a new form of populism prevailed over the values that you previously mentioned that is to say the participation of the community the involvement of the electorate when it comes to important decisions like leaving the uu or electing the american president so to quote an important economist who has been here at the trento festival who said the idea that political leaders like cameron and trump like in particular i think that the brexit is the result involvement of the citizens in the decision-making process where those who think in a certain way prevail over the others without thinking adequately of the consequences of a globalization or leaving the eu so how do you see this democracy in this specific case a democracy can only be globalized if you really want to solve all the problems we've faced right i mean this one as well i mean i think the problem with brexit was also about a skepticism about what the what the experts were saying so you know exactly um the experts in the treasury or in the bank of england or in the international monetary fund exactly these institutions that should be providing a reliable basis for making decisions seemed to be giving advice that was was not right or didn't seem to be plausible and people couldn't really carry out in their minds uh the logic that those those forecasts were were based on and so in part i think um you know both the brexit and the trump phenomenon are votes against the experts um against the experts who are saying what deglobalization is is bad and will have all all these painful consequences um and um you know that that's i think um where talking in big aggregates about what the likely effect on gdp is going to be is the wrong way of going about it what you need to know is really how individual areas will be affected how individual jobs will be affected and so it's it you know already come up i think in a big way in the discussion about the exit from the paris climate agreement that um there aren't that many jobs in coal mining there are not that many jobs that are likely to be created in coal mining but on the other hand there are a lot of jobs in renewable energy that might be at risk as a result of this move and so it's that kind of knowledge rather than the the big scale forecasts that i think are are really going to be crucial for this sequence yes the lack of uh course stabilize the european monetary policies by making very simple statements that however were very credible and later to the expected results so what has led to the skepticism of the citizens towards the um experts what are the main factors it's it's it's i think a very big dilemma um and uh the you know the story is that many many decisions are really quite complex and so if the logic of all of those compromises and all of those decisions is really spelt out it becomes actually difficult uh to follow for for many people um and uh you know i think you you you could uh say exactly this about the the politics of the ecb i mean this is an instance where it actually works in a rather different way and that the suspicion is greatest in germany or in northern europe about the ecb and you know i was almost struck uh that i i read recently it may seem a long way away but a a book about uh martin luther and the reformation and um the the book presented both luther's views of the catholic church and the catholic nuncio's views of martin luther and luther thought that the catholic church was over-sophisticated and over-complex and the theology was over-refined and on the other hand the nuncio thought that luther was just crude and didn't really know latin and didn't understand complex theology and so it seemed to me you know when i read that that this was really addressed to germans who think that mario draghi is too complex and too sophisticated and doesn't understand the fundamental necessity of uh protecting savers and you know it's actually a misplaced kind of suspicion in that in in that case um there are uh just many areas uh which are uh complex but i i go back to this point of thinking um it's better if you can think about it in disaggregated ways and if you don't have to think about big uh abstractions like gdp but you can make it real in terms of what this costs for a particular area or what it does for a particular area that that seems to me to be the area that the experts need need to address in this if the environment area where common policies could be adopted because the environment involves everyone maybe i should listen to it on the uh yes no i think that's a very very important point um i mean and you know again you can you can treat it as a kind of european discussion the um because europe has lots of very ambitious goals in regard to climate change but it's it's actually not very good at meeting them and the energy policies in different european countries are quite different from each other so the pricing of energy is different um so i i think in in you know in in that regard um getting european um wide agreements and you know in particular if you think of the issue of renewables um energy from the sun is much easier to get in southern europe um but then it's a question of transporting solar energy from southern europe um across the alps into northern europe and at the moment there is simply isn't the capacity of the capability of doing those long-term transfers so in order to do that you would need a long-term investment project and that's i think exactly the kind of concrete measure that europe should at the moment uh be contemplating but um it's also uh you know one of the areas and i think that's that's the sense behind your question is um it's it's one of the areas where china and india are more likely now to be on the same page as the europeans than with the united states and in that sense uh it may be one of those instances where what trump has done by very clumsy politics has actually been to create a world that is is really getting together to form its own vision of how how an effective limitation of carbon dioxide emissions can be um but but having said that um you know also what happens in the united states in the next four years is important and so the united states is a great producer of carbon dioxide so to have the united states outside these agreements it's really problematic i would add considering what we were saying about the exposure we saw the lack of trust in the experts so here trump went against uh the say universal agreement of all the scientists who deal with climate change in other words and then we have populism that says that climate change is not even an existing phenomena yes i mean this is similarly i i think it's exactly the same revolt against the experts right so um you know when people build this kind of case they use individual mistakes so undoubtedly some of the people who were trying to present climate change overdid the case and they made statements that can't be properly supported and then that looks as if it blows up the whole of the science but i i i think a legitimate view doesn't really really think of that but you know it's also obviously the case with economists that they got things very badly wrong um in 2007 2008 particularly in the lead up to 2007 2008 and so um some sort of skepticism about experts is appropriate but a radical denial is is really very very dangerous so maybe i could ask a question of the audience if if i may um so how many of you think that globalization as it existed up to now in other words with increased movements of goods and increased movements of people and capital flows is likely to continue do do people think think that good good um and uh who thinks the opposite that there's likely to be a really radical setback so the kind of thing that i sometimes uh in my worst nightmares uh imagine if this this this radical deglobalization so slightly fewer but uh slightly fewer but i i it's very interesting you're really divided about this um and i mean i think that division expresses exactly the sentiment of the you know europe uh italy uh trento but the world as well uh standing on a kind of knife edge and uh wondering which way things are going to move and maybe um you post the question uh in a sort of descriptive and predictive way but what uh what about the the in terms of value of uh it's better to continue it's better to stop in some way do you think people are also divided in this in in the consideration of uh of globalization as a good thing or a bad thing yes absolutely i mean maybe we should have had that other other vote as well do you think it's a good thing or do you think it's a bad thing um because um i think it's one of the the the dilemmas of this that you know looked at from the good of the world as a whole over the last 25 years it's very very clear that it's allowed a very very substantial number of people to escape from extreme poverty um so er the the problem of poverty is really greatly reduced in china in india in most asian countries and not in africa not in sub-saharan africa um but this is a world that for that reason is actually more sustainable but it creates a kind of fallout in the advanced economies where we think that we're losing jobs because of globalization and then increasingly we're also worried that technical change is having the same kind of effect as globalization so at the beginning i think um you know you could see who was losing from globalization in the sense that i remember being in milan about a decade ago more than a decade ago in the early 2000s and there were stories in the newspapers of how skilled workers in the in in clothing and textiles and in leather and shoe manufacturer were going to china on five-year contracts in order to tell chinese workers how to make the quality italian production and you know you could see that they were in effect writing their own jobs off um but today i think we're in a much more radical world and that's uh there are many many jobs um we think of truck drivers that are likely to be marginalized because of the driverless cars but you know you can think of what i do university teaching couldn't this be done more efficiently by machine learning um a lot of legal work a lot of medical work there are a lot of doctors at this meeting because we're primarily thinking about health but in some ways it's you can get much better diagnosis if you have a bracelet that's connected to you and is continually giving real-time information quickly to a diagnostic computer that can then tell you what drugs you should be taking and make sure that you're taking exactly the right number at the right time uh that's much better than a conventional doctor so you know there are very very few jobs in the end that can't be taken away by the combination i think now more of technology than the globalization in 2016 public opinion proved to be very gullible they believed a lot of lies that propaganda was in the u.s and in the uk was told it's not the first time that it happened after all nazi germany had a lot of support from public opinion but do you think that overall new technologies and especially social media and social networks made things worse for democracy of a goal or do you think that despite this there's been more positive than negative effect because of this new implementation of technologies over the last 20-25 years yeah i i mean i think you're right to point to how technology has changed this because it's created communities where they're really in a particular community just exposed to views from that particular point of view um but having said this i mean you know again it may be a point in favor of this argument about why you need openness and why you need the availability of a lot of information um is that um you you can also see a kind of uh change in 2017 to 2016. um so you know i remember at the end of 2016 in the immediate aftermath of the trump election um i was part of a group writing a report on the future of europe and we were thinking about populism and we we said something in this report like um gattvildus in the netherlands um is likely to get 30 of the vote in fact he got 13 of the votes so much much less um marine le pen also got less in the final round of the presidential election than most of the opinion polls were suggesting and it seems to me what was happening in part was that the reaction in the netherlands and in france to what was happening in the united states in the uk the kind of chaos in trump land and the uncertainty about what brexit actually meant um gave a kind of indication of the actual difficulty of uh the post-populist politics in in in in presenting a concrete program and so people in other european countries were repelled and you can see the um the right-wing populist party in germany loses out quite badly and is is fading away in the opinion post graziate can survive um because you know this mood of deglobalization that i can detect in the 1930s is is really pervasive and quite pernicious but the people who stand against it are also talking about the importance of patriotism so in order to fight violent and exclusive and nationalistic uh deglobalization some sort of reference to a patriotic feeling is i think also important so you know the the inspirational figures in the 1930s i would think of as winston churchill or franklin roosevelt or mahatma gandhi um and you know they clearly have a very strong national vision as well as an international vision and uh what they want to do is to make the national and the international vision compatible with each other and uh trying to think of a way of bringing national and international or supranational identities together is i think then it goes back to thinking about what people have in common the kind of last section of what i was trying to talk about um what the foundations are and it's laid out uh i think eloquently in the aftermath of the second world war in the uh universal declaration of human rights and that's also really interestingly a document that's produced not by people from one country but people from a large number of countries where a chinese author and lebanese author play a really important part in the drafting of that article but you you need i think in this framework also some sort of sense of identity and i mean yes of course a commitment to patriotic patriotic families so let's say we can take two final questions and then it this is it so two final questions and then so thanks i have a couple of questions one is um okay let's assume that there is in fact an anti-globalization trend which is rooted in two main factors one would be demand side factors that have to do with perceptions of the population and the other would be supply side factors that come from say political establishment in terms of demand side factors um we're talking about the so-called losses of globalization that are disaffected is enchantments on the the question is um are their votes their opinions self-limiting in other words people who voted for brexit and come from say agriculture background where most of their money comes from agricultural subsidies or people come from areas say you know similar people where um he really is not in the best interest to vote for for brexit are they going to realize that they made a mistake at some point and there would be therefore um a trend against this deglobalization simply because the population comes to see that it doesn't work the second issue is simply has to do with supply-side factors and i was reading i think was in foreign affairs or maybe projects indicate an article that was saying that basically if you compare reactions to trump and reactions to brexit um the the picture that comes out of is very different you know where we're by reaction to trump i've been very uh vocal in in in the united states and there have been major uh protests and so on whereas uh in the uk by and large the population has accepted that one brexit is going to happen two that the hard brexit might very well happen and that the number and frequency of demonstrations have been fairly limited and therefore uh the issue is you know what are the variables that predict reactions to supply side and supply side uh factors themselves sorry if this is something complicated but okay well no it's a very very good question um and you know the first part of it um i think gets at this uh difficulty uh that some of the explanations for the brexit vote are to do with economic losses and so this is the kind of point that um the best article that i know on that is this one by colantonian stanek um from bocconi but part of it is also cultural um and so it's a reaction against the big glittering cosmopolitan cities like london uh which are very successful and where the schools are very good um by people in rural england or in small town england where they think the schools have slipped back and where they're left out of this cultural universe and you know those are exactly the people who maybe as in cornwall they have agricultural subsidies that they get from the eu or in some of the manufacturing terms and striking one that got a lot of commentary was in derby where there's a big aerospace industry which is really dependent on being linked to all the european aerospace but they voted for brexit as well and um their their bosses their managers were telling them all the time they should be voting to stay in but uh you know part of the protest was we don't like the leadership and i think you're beginning to see something uh you know this gets on to your second question why isn't there more reaction against it and i mean in part because nobody really knew what brexit involved and there were so many different scenarios and there's still different scenarios um it goes back to experts projections so if there's some kind of trade agreement that's worked out um it could be relatively small shock um a hard brexit where you suddenly find yourselves without any trade agreement uh is is is a much bigger shock in the moment that that that hits um i think um you you will uh you you will get the protest actually you already get the protests and some of the um election events that uh the prime minister's been holding so um she was in in bath uh either yesterday or the day before yesterday and uh she got a lot of questions from businesses that were worried about the future and worried about their order books um i i think the um you know the question about the protests about trump uh the protests against trump are not primarily driven by economic fears of what happens with trump's deglobalization because again we haven't seen that much of it but it's to do with the cultural stances of donald trump and he's much more militant and much more aggressive and you know i can i can understand that that cultural reaction very well isn't it but it's not primarily uh people going on the streets demanding free trade uh that's that's not what's happening with those protests yeah and i understand that we are running out time so i try to make it short in your very interesting talk you touched very areas but you didn't mention one thing where many people are worried about and that's terrorism what do you think terrorism is a factor that pushes us in the direction of globalization for instance because secret services cooperate are forced to cooperate or is it a factor that pushes us towards the globalization because people want to protect their countries from terrorists right um i mean i i think now uh the way in which terror and terrorism a scene is through the angle of a kind of through the lens of a globalization perspective so they think terrorism comes from outside somewhere and it's it's very different to the world that you know i remember in the 1970s in britain uh there was there was a lot of terrorism uh but it was more targeted it was more targeted against political objectives you know they in the early 1980s uh they blew up the hotel that the cabinet was staying in at the conservative party conference in italy or in germany uh there was the the the terrorism from the left in italy there was terrorism from the right as well in in this area in alto adej in the 60s you had enormous amount of terrorism but nobody suspected that it was global um and so you know when you when you deal with that now you you you know you don't you don't think of this i think anymore it's an issue but you can see in in bolsano the the monuments that are destroyed um you know now we think of of uh terrorism as a as a global threat but you know something like the attack in london uh yesterday evening it did terrible attack but it's a very low technology kind of attack and it's something that demands very very little sophistication it's it's very difficult as a consequence to think of a right strategy for for dealing with that um you know the strategy depends on uh the interception of communications um and the reaction of that by terrorist groups is to go more for these very low level uh bits of terrorism um i i i think we just need to treat that as a a a kind of byproduct of the global world it's it's very very little i think you can really do about it to end it or compared to the values some of these attacks that are very very limited in nature and it is globally speaking over the past 20 30 years uh the terrorism or terrorist attacks have decreased 70s and 80s so it's also a public perception and do you agree on what darydov it's a good point to make i mean i you you know i ended this book in 2001 um with a thought that there are many things that are going to be globalized and so viruses and diseases would be globalized as well and you know that's another aspect that i didn't really think about in the presentation this evening and where again it was the only effective way of combating that is actually by very quick information and you know that that's something that the technology gives us the possibility of finding out um you know if you look at uh if google tells you who is searching um fever or diarrhoea and then puts it on a map you can see whether some of the problems are going to be and so you can you can act much more quickly than if you rely on doctors reporting something to ministries of health and and and and so on but diseases are global um when people travel they will spread uh terrorist global in exactly the same way and i mean in a sense um you know maybe it's not a wrong thing also to think of um terrorism as a disease of the mind of the people who are inflicting the terror either they're somehow turned on or infected by a particular set of ideas and you need to be able to understand the circumstances in which those ideas are set on and which it's it's i i mean i think it's very like an infection um that it's it's a it's a mental problem uh you